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An Inconvenient Mirror1
Do we already have the
next Mental Health Act?
David Hewitt2
1. Introduction
The Government intends to replace the Mental Health Act 1983, and the most recent of its
proposals were contained in the Draft Mental Health Bill published in June 2004.3 (The Draft Bill
has undergone ‘pre-legislative scrutiny’, and the Joint Committee appointed to perform the task
published its report on 23 March 2005.4 The Government published its response to that report on
13 July 2005.5 )
The 1983 Act is now very different to the statute introduced at the end of 1982. Parliament and
the courts have made a number of significant changes over the last 20-odd years, and they have
brought us a lot closer to the next Mental Health Act than many people – and possibly even the
Government – suppose. In fact, those changes may have brought us rather close to the Draft
Mental Health Bill. That will be an uncomfortable thought for many people.
This paper will consider five key aspects of the Draft Mental Health Bill: 
• the provisions dealing with risk and treatability; 
• the notion of compulsion in the community; 
• the status of the Code of Practice; and 
• the abolition of the Approved Social Worker. 
The paper will ask whether, because of the changes of the last two decades, the current Mental
Health Act has already arrived at much the same point. In addition, the paper will consider the
position of incapable patients. Although the Draft Bill contains precious few proposals about
1 This paper is based on a public lecture given at the Hull
School of Health and Social Care on 27 January 2005
2 Solicitor and Partner in Hempsons. Visiting fellow, Law
School, Northumbria University
3 Department of Health, Draft Mental Health Bill,
September 2004, Cm 6305-I; Ibid, Draft Mental
Health Bill: Explanatory Notes, June 2004, Cm 6305-
II; Ibid, Improving Mental Health Law: Towards a new
Mental Health Act, September 2004 
4 Joint Committee on the Draft Mental Health Bill,
Session 2004–2005, Draft Mental Health Bill, Volume
I, HL Paper 79-I, HC 95-I, Volume II, HL Paper 79-II,
HC 95-II, Volume III, HL Paper 79-III, HC 95-III. (A
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found at www.hempsons.co.uk )
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them, the paper will ask whether recent developments have made a broad definition of mental
disorder all but essential.
2. The Relevant Conditions
The Draft Mental Health Bill is about far more than ‘detention’. The powers it contains will be
capable of being used, not just in hospitals, but also in the community. A patient against whom the
expanded powers are used will be said to be “subject to compulsion”.
Once a person is found to be suffering from mental disorder, as that term is to be broadly defined,
it will be possible under the Draft Bill to make him subject to compulsion if each of the Relevant
Conditions is met.6 There are five Relevant Conditions, and some of them are extremely
controversial.7
(a) Risk
It is the Third Relevant Condition that deals with the risk a person must pose, either to himself or
others, before he can be made subject to compulsion.8
It will be possible to make a person subject to compulsion if that is necessary for the protection
of other persons.9 That proposal is controversial in itself,10 but the proposal concerning people
whose only risk is to themselves is equally so.
For compulsion to be possible in those circumstances, the Third Relevant Condition says it will
have to be “necessary, for the protection of the patient from suicide or serious self-harm, or serious
neglect by him of his health or safety, [...] that medical treatment be provided” to him.11
The Government says that in comparison to the 1983 Act, “the threshold of harm to self has been
raised”.12 It is certainly true that the current Mental Health Act affords the patient much less
leeway: in allowing him to be detained for his own health or safety, it doesn’t require that the risk
is ‘serious’.13 Yet, for all that, it seems likely that the Draft Bill would do no more than give
statutory recognition to the present state-of-affairs. Even now, there are so few in-patient beds that
they can usually be given only to people who present a risk of suicide or a serious risk of self-harm
or a serious risk of neglect.14
(b) Treatability15
According to the Fifth Relevant Condition, it will not be possible to make a person subject to
compulsion unless “medical treatment is available which is appropriate in his case”.16 This is a very
6 Department of Health, Draft Mental Health Bill,
September 2004, Cm 6305-I, cl 2(5) 
7 Ibid, cl 9
8 Ibid, cl 9(4)
9 Ibid, cl 9(4)(b)
10 See, for example: Joint Committee on the Draft Mental
Health Bill, Ibid, vol I, paras 121 & 122; Department
of Health, 2005, Ibid, Recommendation 20.
11 Ibid, cl 9(4)(a)
12 Department of Health, Improving Mental Health Law:
Towards a new Mental Health Act, September 2004,
para 3.15
13 MHA 1983, s 2(2)(b) & 3(2)(c)
14 See, Joint Committee, Ibid, Vol II, Ev 280 (David
Hewitt), para 2.3
15 See, Joint Committee, Ibid, Vol II, Ev 280 (David
Hewitt), para 2.2
16 Department of Health, Draft Mental Health Bill,
September 2004, Cm 6305-I, cl 9(6)
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controversial proposal.17 Some critics of the Draft Bill claim that it represents a dilution of the
current ‘treatability test’. 
The treatability test is contained in section 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983. It provides, amongst
other things, that a person suffering from psychopathic disorder may be detained only if he is
‘treatable’.18 Critics say this test is being diluted because it makes it too hard to detain psychopaths. 
In fact, and perhaps surprisingly, the Government agrees with this analysis. It says the treatability test,
“[...] has led to uncertainty about whether a patient’s disorder can be treated or not, irrespective
of any opinion that they remain a risk to themselves or others. Some patients are not being
brought under the Act even when it is appropriate to do so.”19
This conclusion is wrong. The Government has misunderstood several important legal judgments
and, as a result, exaggerated the strength of the treatability test. Its proposal is a solution to a
problem that doesn’t exist.20
As used in the Mental Health Act, the term ‘medical treatment’ currently includes, “nursing [...] and
care, habilitation and rehabilitation under medical supervision”.21 This is a very broad definition,
which the courts have broadened still further. Now, the treatability test will be satisfied, and a patient
will be detainable under the 1983 Act, if hospital treatment will prevent deterioration in his condition,
or make him less uncooperative or more insightful;22 or if it is likely to impact on his symptoms, even
if it won’t touch the substantive illness.23 In Wheldon, the High Court said, “It is plain [...] that the
concept [of treatability] is a very wide one”;24 while in Reid, the House of Lords said the definition of
‘treatment’ was now so wide that its purpose “may extend from cure to containment”.25
There must be very few patients whose condition – or the symptoms of whose condition – cannot
be alleviated, or whose deterioration cannot be prevented, by some form of clinical intervention. 
It is difficult, therefore, to see how the treatability test in the 1983 Act is anything other than a 
dead letter, and surprising, perhaps, that the Government should be willing to risk so much to
abolish it.26
The desire to make psychopaths detainable, and the mistaken belief that they aren’t already
detainable, are at the centre of the Government’s plans for a new Mental Health Act. In fact, some
might say that they have distorted those plans. That is unfortunate. But it shouldn’t just colour our
view of the Draft Bill; it should also affect the way we think about the current Act. 
17 Department of Health, 2005, Ibid, Recommendation 74
18 MHA 1983, s 3(2)(b)
19 Department of Health, Draft Mental Health Bill:
Explanatory Notes, June 2004, Cm 6305-II, para
C9.10. See also, Department of Health and Home
Office, Reforming the Mental Health Act – Part I: The
new legal framework, December 2000, Cm 5016-I,
paras 1.15 & 3.5; Department of Health, Draft
Mental Health Bill: Explanatory Notes, June 2002,
Cm 5538-II, para 2.11
20 David Hewitt, Treatability Tests, Solicitors Journal,
146 (37), 4 October 2002, pp 886 & 887
21 MHA 1983, s 145
22 R v Canons Park Mental Health Review Tribunal, ex
parte A [1994] All ER 659, CA, per Roch LJ
23 R v Secretary of State for Scotland, 1998 SC 49, 2 Div
24 R (Wheldon) v Rampton Hospital Authority [2001]
EWHC 134 (Admin), per Elias J at para 14
25 Reid v Secretary of State for Scotland [1999] 1 All ER
481
26 In fact, it would seem that the Government has an even
wider conception of treatability. In its response to the
Joint Committee, it said that compulsion need not be
limited to those cases where treatment will improve a
patient’s condition or prevent it deteriorating. See,
Department of Health, Ibid, Recommendations 21 &
22. This raises the possibility that it will be lawful to
confine and compulsorily treat a mental health patient
for the sole purpose of making his/her condition worse.
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3. Non-resident Patients
Under the Draft Mental Health Bill, a person to whom compulsion is applied when he is not in
hospital will be a ‘non-resident patient’.27 The Government has been disingenuous about its motive
for making this change.28
(a) Motive
Most recently, the Government claimed that non-resident patients were the embodiment of the
principle of the ‘least restrictive alternative’. This principle is best summarised in the Mental
Health Act 1983 Code of Practice, which states that anyone who is subject to the Act should,
“be given any necessary treatment or care in the least controlled and segregated facilities
compatible with ensuring their own health or safety or the safety of other people.”29
This is the spirit the Government wishes to invoke now. In a paper published alongside the Draft
Bill, it said:
“The intention of allowing patients to be under formal powers in the community is to provide
greater flexibility to practitioners so that the principle of least restriction can be put into
effect.”30
However, five years ago the Government said something rather different. In its White Paper it said,
“At the moment clinicians have to wait until patients in the community become ill enough to
need admission to hospital before compulsory treatment can be given. This prevents early
intervention to reduce risk to both patients and the public”.31
Far from reflecting the ‘principle of least restriction’, it seems that community compulsion – in
other words, the ‘non-resident patient’ scheme – is necessary to protect the public. Here, and not
perhaps for the first time, the Government might be accused of trying to appeal to two different,
even antipathetic, constituencies.
The Government may have been disingenuous about is plans, but is it possible that community
compulsion is already a reality; that many people outside hospital are ‘non-resident patients’ in all
but name?
(b) Leave 
It is necessary to consider the case of DR.32 In that case, a patient’s detention under section 3 of
the Mental Health Act 1983 was renewed for a further 6 months even though she was on unlimited
leave of absence. The only relevant requirement was that she return to hospital for the ward round
every Monday and OT every Friday. The High Court said it was lawful to renew the patient’s
27 The Joint Committee has criticised these proposals and
recommended that more rigorous conditions be
introduced for community compulsion. See, Joint
Committee, Ibid, Vol I, paras 187–199. In response, the
Government has said it does not propose to make any
such changes. See, Department of Health, 2005, Ibid,
Recommendation 33.
28 See, Joint Committee, Ibid, Vol II, Ev 280 (David
Hewitt), para 2.6
29 MHA 1983 Code of Practice, para 1.1
30 Department of Health, Improving Mental Health Law:
Towards a new Mental Health Act, September 2004,
para 3.35. See also, Department of Health, 2005, Ibid,
Recommendation 33
31 Department of Health and Home Office, Reforming the
Mental Health Act – Part I: The new legal framework,
December 2000, Cm 5016-I , para 2.14; emphasis
added
32 R (DR) v Mersey Care NHS Trust, Administrative
Court (Wilson J), 7 August 2002, CO/1232/2002
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detention in those circumstances, because treatment in hospital – the OT and the ward round –
formed a “significant component” of the plan for her.33
This decision has been seen as re-introducing the ‘long leash’ that doctors had been asked to abjure
since the case of Hallstrom,34 and it has been confirmed, and possibly even extended, by the recent
High Court decision in the case of CS.35
It has always been clear that, as a matter of general law, a patient may have her leave revoked, and
she may be recalled to hospital, at any time by her Responsible Medical Officer (‘RMO’).36
Provided she is given the relevant notice in writing, it isn’t necessary for the RMO to have a good
reason for revocation and recall, or for the RMO to have any reason at all.
What the DR and CS cases suggest is that by the careful use of section 17, a person who remains
‘liable to be detained’ in hospital may be maintained in the community indefinitely and hauled
back into hospital if she acts inappropriately. There would appear to be no difference between that
patient’s situation and the situation of a ‘non-resident patient’ under the Draft Mental Health Bill. 
4. The Code of Practice
Like the present Mental Health Act, the next one will have a Code of Practice.37 However, on the
face of it, the next Code will be less binding than the present one.
It would seem from the Draft Mental Health Bill that hospitals and practitioners will only need to
“have regard” to the new Code.38 The fear is that this would strip the Code of Practice of its
essential force. 
Whilst that may be a legitimate concern, it is questionable whether the new proposals diminish the
Code of Practice at all. In the Munjaz case, the House of Lords held that the Code of Practice on
the 1983 Act was guidance, and not binding, and that professionals and providers might lawfully
depart from it if they had “cogent reason” to do so. (The Court of Appeal had earlier held that
departures from the Code would be lawful where there was “good reason” for them.)39
5. An Approved Mental Health Professional
The Approved Mental Health Professional is the replacement for the Approved Social Worker
(‘ASW’), and the ASW role is to be abolished. The Government’s proposals in this regard are
perhaps the most perplexing in the whole Draft Bill.
33 David Hewitt, There is no magic in a bed, Journal of
Mental Health Law, August 2003, pp 87–101
34 R v Hallstrom and another, ex parte W; R v Gardner
and another, ex parte L [1986] 2 All ER 306
35 R (CS) v Mental Health Review Tribunal [2004]
EWHC 2958 (Admin). See further within this issue of
the JMHL for a review of this case.
36 MHA 1983, s 17(4)
37 Department of Health, Draft Mental Health Bill,
September 2004, Cm 6305-I, cl 1
38 Ibid, cl 1(2) & (5)
39 R (Munjaz) v Mersey Care NHS Trust [2005] UKHL
58; R (Munjaz) v Mersey Care NHS Trust; R (S) v
Airedale NHS Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1036.
(Detailed papers on each of these cases may be found at
www.hempsons.co.uk) David Hewitt, A room of one’s
own – seclusion is at last lawful, The Times, 26
November 2002; David Hewitt, A secluded view, New
Law Journal, 153 (7090), 25 July 2003, p 1133; David
Hewitt, The seclusion of psychiatric patients: trusts’
position clarified, Health Care Risk Report, 10(1),
November 2003, pp 17 & 18
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(a) Motive
The Government has given six main reasons for introducing a new Mental Health Act.40 Two of
them concern the ASW, and looked at from that perspective, they appear to lack logic. 
(i) Up-dating principles
In 1999, the Government said it wanted to “bring up to date the principles and processes
established by the 1959 and 1983 Mental Health Acts”.41
One of the key principles of the current Act was the balancing of the ‘medical model’ of mental
illness with the ‘social model’. Because he was seen as an arch proponent of the social model, the
ASW was given significant powers. However, the Draft Bill abolishes the ASW role. 
In future, it is the Approved Mental Health Professional who will make an application for
compulsion, and he won’t have to be a social worker. He might be a community psychiatric nurse
or an occupational therapist, and he might even be employed by the NHS trust that is to be
responsible for subjecting a patient to compulsion.42
Where does that leave the ‘social model’ of mental illness? More generally, how far can a
Government go with legislation before the principles it hopes to up-date it actually destroys? 
(ii) Inadequate knowledge
The Government has said that the way the current Mental Health Act is applied varies widely
between different parts of the country, and that this has something to do with a lack of knowledge
amongst mental health professionals. Though they are “mostly people with professional training in
clinical and social care,” the Government says, “few have specialist training in or understanding of
the law”.43 However, this suggestion raises more questions than it answers. 
If professionals know too little about the existing Mental Health Act, why is a new Mental Health
Act required? Wouldn’t the answer be to provide more and better training on the existing Act? The
one group of professionals that does receive specialist training in mental health law is ASWs, yet,
as has been noted, the Draft Bill would abolish their role.
The Government is deeply confused about its motives for abolishing the ASW. However, it is also
necessary to ask whether the Approved Mental Health Professional, or something very like him,
is already a feature of psychiatric practice, more than two years before the Draft Bill is scheduled
to become law.
40 David Hewitt, Windmills, not giants, Solicitors Journal,
148 (42), 5 November 2004, pp 1271 & 1272
41 Department of Health, Reform of the Mental Health
Act 1983: Proposals for Consultation, November 1999,
Cm 4480, para 1.3. (Slightly more information may
now be found in Department of Health, 2005, Ibid,
Recommendation 102.)
42 Department of Health, Draft Mental Health Bill,
September 2004, Cm 6305-I, cl 15(1), 16(3), 19(2) &
22(1)
43 Department of Health, Reform of the Mental Health
Act 1983: Proposals for Consultation, November 1999,
Cm 4480, para 2.8. See also, Department of Health,
Reforming the Mental Health Act – Part I: The new
legal framework, December 2000, Cm 5016-I, paras
1.14 & 2.6
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(b) Proposals
As has been indicated, it won’t be necessary for an Approved Mental Health Professional to be a
social worker.44 If, in a particular case, he should turn out to be a community psychiatric nurse or
an occupational therapist, there are two principal fears. 
The first fear is that in that case, not only the two recommendations but also the compulsion
application itself would be provided by someone whose primary allegiance was to the ‘medical
model’ of mental health, and that as a result, the ‘social model’ would be ignored. 
The Government has tried to address this fear. It has said, “The competence required of an AMHP
will be broadly similar to that required of an ASW currently”.45 However, a nurse is not a social
worker, and their perspectives, training and experience differ very widely. Therefore, the loss of the
social model must remain a legitimate fear. 
The second fear is about a loss of independence.46 At the moment, the ASW is not only the sole
exemplar of the ‘social model’; he is also wholly independent and cannot, for example, be
compelled to make an admission application.
If it will be possible in future for a compulsion application to be made by an employee of the body
that is to do the compelling, the fear is that he will be more biddable than an ASW would have
been and that a crucial element of independence will have been lost. That, again, is a legitimate fear.
However, given what the law allows even now, is the feared position really so far away?
Here, it is necessary to consider partnership working, which perhaps reaches its culmination in the
Care Trust. In most if not all of the mental health partnerships and care trusts that have been
created so far great pains have been taken to keep local authority mental health functions outside
the formal structure of the partnership or trust. However, the simple truth is that this is more than
the law requires.
Partnership arrangements between local authorities and NHS bodies have been possible since the year
2000, when section 31 of the Health Act 1999 came into force. Under the relevant regulations, a social
services authority may give nearly all of its “health related functions” (as they are defined in Schedule
1 of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970) to the partnership, and thereby delegate the
performance of those functions to its NHS partner.47 (In fact, the only “health related functions” a
local authority can’t give away are the appointment of ASWs and its powers of entry and inspection). 
This means that where there is a mental health partnership or care trust, a whole swathe of local
authority mental health functions could pass to a NHS trust. They include: directing an ASW to
consider making an admission application;48 receiving a patient into guardianship;49 and providing
after-care once a patient has left hospital.50
If the relevant agreement so provides, all of these local authority functions will be performed by a
NHS body, and the staff that perform them, including any ASWs, will be answerable to that NHS
body.
44 Department of Health, Draft Mental Health Bill:
Explanatory Notes, June 2004, Cm 6305-II, para 36
45 Ibid
46 The Joint Committee did not share this fear. See, Joint
Committee, Ibid, Vol I, para 445
47 The NHS Bodies and Local Authorities Partnership
Arrangements Regulations 2000 (SI 2000 No 617), regs
4 & 6
48 MHA 1983, s 13(4)
49 Ibid, ss 7 & 8
50 Ibid, s 117
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This could be seen as a positive thing. Under these arrangements the ‘social model’ of mental
health is not left on the periphery; it is moved to the very centre of the detention process and
allowed to compete on equal terms with the ‘medical model’. However, there is another way of
seeing it.
There is nothing in the new partnership possibilities that would allow a NHS trust to order an
ASW to make an admission application, so that element of independence is preserved. However,
where there is formal partnership working there is at least the possibility that all other functions
of an ASW, and all other mental health functions of a local authority, will be under the direct
control of a NHS trust.
Ultimately, of course, the social services authority will be still be liable for the way someone else
performs the health-related functions it has given them. However, the new arrangements mean
much more than ASWs occasionally being managed by health professionals. 
Even now, long before the Draft Bill becomes a reality, the context in which a detention application
is to be judged could be an avowedly medical one, and the entire statutory process – from
assessment to aftercare – could be performed by practitioners whose primary fealty is owed to the
NHS body that will do the detaining.
One of the other functions a social services authority can give to a partnership is the function of
being a patient’s Nearest Relative under the 1983 Act.51 This means that a NHS trust that is “the
managers” of a hospital for the purposes of the Act could also find that it is the Nearest Relative
of a patient whom it is detaining or, where it has assumed such responsibilities, of a patient of
whom it is also the Guardian. Though undoubtedly intriguing, these are also troubling
possibilities. 
6. Incapable patients
It is necessary to consider the case of MH.52 This case concerned a young woman who was detained
under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983. Because an application had been made to displace
her mother as the ‘nearest relative’, the patient’s detention continued long after the usual 28-day
period had come to an end.
The Court of Appeal held that where a section 2 patient is ‘incapable’ of making an application to
a Mental Health Review Tribunal, there should be a system to ensure that her case comes before a
tribunal. And it said that because the current Mental Health Act doesn’t provide such a system, it
is incompatible with the ‘right to liberty’ in Article 5 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.
There are at least two ways of interpreting this decision. The first interpretation says that incapable
patients who are detained must have the same Mental Health Act rights as capable patients. This is
the more restrictive interpretation. However, it still has some quite significant implications. 
It means, for example: that the current Act will have to be amended, in order to give incapable
section 2 patients something like an automatic right of appeal; that section 3 patients who are
51 MHA 1983, s 29(1)
52 R (MH) v The Secretary of State for the Department of
Health [2004] EWCA Civ 1690. (A detailed paper on
this case may be found at www.hempsons.co.uk). This
paper was last revised on 16th October 2005, shortly
before the House of Lords judgment in the case of MH
((2005) UKHL 60). Notwithstanding the decision of
the House of Lords, the writer submits that his reasoning
within this section of this paper remains sound.
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incapable will probably have to be given the same right; and that the Draft Mental Health Bill will
also have to be amended, to the same effect.53
It may be that it is also contrary to the Human Rights Convention for any mental health laws to be
applied differentially. In other words, incapable patients might have to have all the same Mental
Health Act rights as capable patients. This wouldn’t be limited to tribunal rights; it would apply to
every aspect of compulsory treatment for mental disorder.
This idea is worthy of being explored in more detail: it might contradict recent trends and also
compromise what was seen as the best hope of all those who opposed the current Draft Bill. 
Drawing on the report of the Expert Committee under Professor Richardson,54 and taking
encouragement from the obiter comments of Lord Justice Simon Brown in the case of Wilkinson,55
many have argued that capable patients should have the right to refuse medical treatment for
mental disorder, even if they are subject to detention. However, that isn’t a right they have claimed
for incapable patients. 
The MH judgment suggests that it’s all or nothing: that incapable patients must have the same rights
as capable patients if they are subject to detention. 
The Government dismissed Professor Richardson’s proposals for a capacity-based system of
compulsion, and its Green Paper, White Paper and first Draft Bill didn’t admit capacity as an issue
at all.56 57
The current Draft Mental Health Bill offers some small concessions: it gives capable patients the
right to refuse ECT,58 and to refuse to be transferred to another hospital.59 It doesn’t give similar
rights to incapable patients, so maybe it too is called into question by the MH decision.
There might be a second, more far-reaching interpretation of the MH judgment. It may be that
there is no justification for giving incapable patients fewer rights of any kind – and not just fewer
Mental Health Act rights – than are enjoyed by capable patients. In other words, maybe incapable
patients – even incapable patients who are detained in hospital – cannot be treated any differently
just because they are incapable. This is where the Bournewood case comes in. 
In the HL case,60 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that it was unlawful, and that it
would breach the right to liberty in Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, to
admit an incapable patient to hospital under the common law doctrine of ‘necessity’ if what was
to be done to him there would amount to a deprivation of his liberty. And it interpreted
53 David Hewitt, Incapacity and the right to liberty, New
Law Journal, 155 (7158), 7 January 2005, pp 26 & 27
54 Department of Health, Review of the Mental Health
Act 1983: Report of the Expert Committee, November
1999, paras 5.96 & 5.97
55 R (Wilkinson) v RMO Broadmoor Hospital [2001]
EWCA Civ 1545
56 See, for example, Department of Health, Reform of the
Mental Health Act 1983: Proposals for Consultation,
November 1999, Cm 4480, chap 5, para 6
57 However, the Joint Committee suggested that one of the
conditions for compulsion should be that, by reason of
mental disorder, a patient’s ability to make decisions
about the provision of medical treatment is
“significantly impaired”. See, Joint Committee, Ibid,
Vol I, para 156. The Government has dismissed this
suggestion. See, Department of Health, 2005, Ibid,
Recommendation 26.
58 Department of Health, Draft Mental Health Bill,
September 2004, Cm 6305-I, cl 178 & 179
59 Ibid, cl 75–79
60 HL v United Kingdom, Application no 45508/99,
decision of 5 October 2004. (A detailed paper on this
case may be found at www.hempsons.co.uk)
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‘deprivation of liberty’ in such a way that most forms of confinement, treatment and control
would be caught by its decision.61
As a result of this case, a new framework will have to be devised by which incapable patients can
be ‘detained’ in a way that complies with Article 5.62 Even the Government has conceded as
much.63
At the very least, this framework will have to cover all incapable patients who need Bournewood-
style detention. But not all incapable patients admitted to hospital under ‘necessity’ meet the
criteria for detention under the Mental Health Act. For example, some of them are incapable
because of an acquired brain injury; they aren’t in a state of arrested or incomplete development
of mind, and they don’t, therefore, come within the statutory definition of ‘mental impairment’
or ‘severe mental impairment’.64
So, if they are to be detainable the new framework will have to have a much broader conception of
‘mental disorder’ – or of the sorts of conditions that justify detention – than the current Act.
Effectively – and to persist with the current classifications – it would be necessary to provide that
a person might be detained if he suffered from mental illness, mental impairment, severe mental
impairment or psychopathic disorder, or if he was incapable in some material way.
That, in itself would be a significant step. But might the law now require even more than that? Does
the MH case mean that it isn’t possible to use ‘incapacity’ as a substantive ground for confinement?
Does it mean that incapable patients can only be confined if they meet the criteria that capable
patients must meet in order to be confined?
That would not present an insuperable obstacle in the case of a patient whose incapacity amounted
to ‘mental impairment’ or ‘severe mental impairment’ under the 1983 Act, or where an incapable
patient was also suffering from ‘mental illness’ or ‘psychopathic disorder’. Other cases, however,
might prove more problematic.
If it were not possible to use ‘incapacity’ as a substantive ground for confinement but it were still
necessary to devise a system for the confinement of the incapable, another way to do it would be
to adopt a very broad definition of ‘mental disorder’; a definition that was so broad that it covered
everyone from people with schizophrenia to those with acquired brain injury, and, more
importantly, from psychopaths to the learning disabled or dementia-impaired. The Draft Bill
already contains a definition of mental disorder that is very broad – that is, perhaps, broad enough
for this purpose. Hitherto, however, critics of the Bill have attacked this definition, and they’ve
done so specifically because of its broadness. It is conceivable that they may now find themselves
having to change tack.
61 David Hewitt, Effective, Unqualified Control, New
Law Journal, 154 (7149), 22 October 2004, pp 1553 &
1554 
62 See, Joint Committee, Ibid, Vol I, paras 179 & 180;
Ibid, Vol II, Ev 281 (David Hewitt), paras 4.1 & 4.2;
Ibid, Vol III, Ev 843 (W A Leason)
63 Department of Health, Advice on the decision of the
European Court of Human Rights in the case of HL v
UK (the “Bournewood” case), 10 December 2004,
paras 30 & 31. See also: Department of Health,
Bournewood consultation: The approach to be taken in
response to the judgment of the European Court of
Human Rights in the “Bournewood” case, March 2005,
para 1.2; Department of Health, 2005, Ibid,
Recommendation 29. The Joint Committee reported that
on 22 February 2005, the Government tabled
amendments to the Mental Capacity Bill that it said
would have the desired effect. See, Joint Committee,
Ibid, para 181 and n. 211.
64 MHA 1983, s 1(2)
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It is dangerous to extrapolate too far from a single High Court judgment, even one as intriguing
and apparently fertile as MH. However, if this is where the law is leading – if, because of
Bournewood and because of MH, it is necessary to have a far wider definition of ‘mental disorder’
– it is clear that the current position is not far removed from the one proposed in the Draft Mental
Health Bill.
In any case, it may be that we are entering an odd, looking-glass world; a world where those who
have so far seen a capacity-based model of compulsion as the epitome of everything good and a
broad definition of ‘mental disorder’ as the epitome of everything bad suddenly find themselves
arguing for the reverse.
7. Conclusion
In summary, then:
(a) Although the Relevant Conditions are controversial, the most extreme of them simply re-
state the current position: patients who aren’t a danger to others have to pose a serious risk
to themselves if they’re to be detained and almost every patient passes the ‘treatability test’.
(b) With regard to ‘non-resident’ patients, the Government wants it both ways: it says it wishes
merely to up-date the principle of the ‘least restrictive alternative’, so patients should be in
the community unless they really need to be in hospital; but it also says that community
treatment increases the risk to the public.
(c) Because of the DR case, we already have ‘non-resident’ patients, who can be made to reside
in hospital at the drop of a hat.
(d) As for the Code of Practice, it’s not as strong as many believe, so even the weak Code
envisaged by the Draft Bill won’t, in truth, be any weaker.
(e) The reasons given for killing off the ASW don’t stack up. In any case, an ASW embedded
in a mental health partnership or care trust might be an Approved Mental Health
Professional in all but name.
(f) And finally, the need to improve the lot of ‘Bournewood patients’ might rule out a capacity-
based model of compulsion, and it might also usher in a much wider definition of ‘mental
disorder’ than is contained in the 1983 Act.
This doesn’t, of course, mean that we already have everything in the Draft Bill. However, the leap
to there from here may not be as great as some – most – have assumed.
That’s not to say that criticism should be withheld: even if a surprising proportion of the Draft
Bill is, on closer inspection, quite familiar, there’s still a lot of it that should give cause for concern.
But that concern should not be confined to the Draft Bill.
If there’s no ‘treatability test’ worthy of the name, it is because the courts have reasoned it out of
existence. If leave patients can be kept on a long leash, that is because the High Court said it was
OK. And if the Code of Practice is weak, that is because the House of Lords said it did not need
to be any stronger. But the courts could only do this because the Mental Health Act allowed them
to. And if the ASW is nothing more than the Approved Mental Health Professional in different
shoes, that is because Parliament wanted it that way.
An Inconvenient Mirror. Do we already have the next Mental Health Act?
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In making its current proposals, the Government has held up an inconvenient mirror, one in which
our current mental health laws are rather alarmingly reflected. And the shapes that form in that
inconvenient mirror force us to confront a worrying possibility.65 It may be that what we would
like to see – what we have until now tried to see – as flaws in the Draft Bill are actually something
quite different: maybe they’re really hard, durable, unyielding seams deep within the Mental Health
Act we already have.
65 David Hewitt, Windmills, not giants, Solicitors Journal, 148 (42), 5 November 2004, pp 1271 & 1272
